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Abstract
This thesis looks at government censorship of Chinese social media, with a focus 
on the especially vibrant medium of micro-blogs – weibo   微博 in Chinese. It 
looks in detail at what kind of content is more likely to be censored, and how 
effective that censorship is. The approach is to conceptualise the Chinese online 
environment and the state-user interaction. Using these findings a hypothesis is 
then formulated, which suggests that the main focus of censorship of social media 
in China is on pre-emptive measures, directed against the organisation of social 
collective  action  online  and  offline.  On  the  whole,  the  conclusion  is  that  an 
online/offline  dichotomy  is  too  simple  to  describe  the  Chinese  online 
environment. This hypothesis is then tried and proven valid by the method of a 
case  study,  where  deleted  posts  from  Sina  Weibo  collected  on  the  database 
WeiboScope Search are analysed.  
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1 Introduction
The  choice  of  the  subject  of  this  thesis  sprung  from my previous  interest  in 
censorship and social media in non-democratic liberal systems – as well as my 
will  to  capitalise  on previous  studies  in  Mandarin  Chinese.  Social  media  is  a 
complex  environment,  and  in  China  made  all  the  more  so  due  to  the  heavy 
presence of state  censorship and public  opinion channelling.  I  believe that  the 
knowledge of Chinese social media and e-governance initiatives by the state is 
vital for an understanding of Chinese society as it navigates the many obstacles 
that it will surely come up against in the decades to come. I hope that this study 
will contribute to that knowledge.
1.1 The Chinese micro blog  
Chinese micro blogs (  微博 weibo in Chinese), with inspiration drawn from the 
Western micro blog portal Twitter, is a form of social media where users share 
content or post messages with a maximum length of 186 characters per message – 
hence the 'micro' format, as opposed to conventional blogs which have no such 
restrictions. As with Twitter, this allows for a fast rate of reading, posting, and 
dissemination of information. 
A difference from micro blog platforms in other countries  is that the Chinese 
writing system – based on logograms instead of an alphabet - allows for a much 
larger  amount  of  information  to  be  communicated  in  such a  small  space.   A 
difference  from  for  example  the  international  Twitter  is  that  on  most  weibo 
services it is possible to comment directly on specific posts instead of just having 
a forwarding function. More than that, the user can also attach pictures and videos 
directly to posts, or send private messages to users in a chat function similar to 
instant messenger services, or create groups for specific interests. 
The two largest social media platform providers, QQ's Tencent Weibo1 and 
Sina Weibo2 -  the object  of study for this  thesis  – boast  between 200 to 250 
million users each, about a tenth of whom are active on a daily basis. In terms of 
data generated, users of either service make a collective amount of 100 million 
posts  a  day,  equalling  the  total  amount  of  daily  posting on Twitter,  a  service 
encompassing the entire West. Of these websites statistical  surveys have found 
that users who frequent Sina Weibo generally are more highly educated than those 
who  frequent  the  somewhat  bigger  QQ  Tencent  Weibo  Site.  (Lee  2012)  In 
1http://t.qq.com/   
2http://www.weibo.com/   
1
University of Lund STVK02
Institution of Political Science VT13
Mentor: Martin Hall
comparison to Twitter, and certainly because of the language divide, Weibo has 
only recently caught the attention of Western scholars.
Since  the  establishment  of  the  internet  in  China  it  has  been  subject  to 
censorship  and  control  by  the  Chinese  state.  Expansion  of  infrastructural 
capacities have been matched with increased structural control over the flow of 
information online. However, with the miraculous ascent in popularity of social 
media in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has recognized the change 
that has been brought upon the power structure of Chinese society, and calls have 
been made for officials to pay greater attention to online based public opinion. At 
the  same  time,  the  elaborate  system of  censorship  that  encompasses  all  other 
aspects of media and information distribution in Chinese society has now been 
expanded to include social media as well.
1.2 Research question and demarcation
What are then the fundamental principles guiding the censorship policies of social 
media in China today? In this thesis I will argue that it is evident that instead of 
controlling  the  narrative  as  it  does  with  traditional  media,  when dealing  with 
censorship of social media the Chinese government has shifted its focus to mainly 
prevent large scale incidents such as demonstrations or riots. 
Due to the limitations connected to my primary sources, I have decided that 
my main focus of analysis is to deduce the primary focus of the first phase of 
censorship  measures  on  Sina  Weibo.  This  leads  to  the  following  research 
question: 
What kind of social media content primarily tends to be censored in China?
Contrary to the international Twitter, in China there is no absolute monopoly in 
the micro-blogging sphere, and Sina Weibo has many contenders. However, for 
the purpose of this thesis, I will use Sina Weibo as the object of my study. This is 
firstly due to my own familiarity with that particular service provider. Secondly, 
to my knowledge it is the only site that has databases set up for the collection of 
censored posts, making it an extremely convenient object of study. I will use the 
database  provided  by  the  WeiboScope  Search  project  set  up  by  Hong  Kong 
University.  Thirdly,  Sina Weibo has by far the biggest active user body of all 
social media providers in China, only rivalled by Tencent Weibo. 
2
University of Lund STVK02
Institution of Political Science VT13
Mentor: Martin Hall
1.3 Recent studies on censorship
Three recent studies have provided valuable insight into the possible raison d'être 
of the internet censorship policy of the Chinese government. A Carnegie Mellon 
University study conducted by  David Bamman, Brendan O'Connor, and Noah A. 
Smith  analysed  the  orientation  of  active  deletion  of  messages  by  censorship 
administrators by making a statistical analysis of 56 million messages containing 
words deemed to be politically sensitive and cross-referencing findings with 11 
million  Chinese-language  messages  from  Twitter.  The  study  found  a  set  of 
politically  sensitive  terms  whose  presence  in  a  message  leads  to  anomalously 
higher deletion rates. The study further noted that censorship measures on Sina 
Weibo  correlates  highly  with  spikes  in  media  coverage  of  sensitive  stories.
(Bamman et al 2012)
A second study, How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but  
Silences Collective Expression, conducted by Gary King at Harvard University 
(King  et  al  2012)  found  that,  contrary  to  current  understandings,  posts  with 
content critical  of the state and its  leaders are not more likely to be censored. 
Rather,  the  focus  of  censorship  is  oriented  towards  attempting  to  forestall 
collective social activities (群体性事件) tied to circumstances in the present or 
that may occur in the future. To this end, content that represent, reinforce or spur 
social mobilization is deleted. More importantly, even content that is positive of 
the government but still might give rise to social mobilization is deleted. While 
the study examined censorship of discussion boards and not micro blogs, it  is 
likely  that  the  reasoning  concerning  censorship  of  discussion  board  content 
follows the same guidelines as that of micro blogs.
The Carnegie Mellon study found that of 1.3 million Sina Weibo messages 
containing  sensitive  keywords  checked,  212,583  messages  or  16  % had  been 
deleted within a month of collection. This correlates with the Harvard University 
study's find of a rate of deletion of a similar quantity. The study also found that 
the rate of message deletion was not uniform throughout China; rather messages 
originating from regions with more sensitive relations with the Chinese state, such 
as Tibet, Qinghai or Xinjiang, deletion rates were as high as 50 %. These finding 
might relate to the fact that protests are more likely to occur in provinces where 
the  support  for  Party  rule  is  the  lowest.  In  the  bigger  cities  like  Beijing  and 
Shanghai, deletion rates were between 12 to 16 %. (Bamman et al 2012)
The fact that deletion rates of sensitive messages is higher in some provinces 
can  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  outlying  provinces  have  lower  population 
numbers  and  density  than  those  of  Eastern  China,  making  content  easier  to 
control.  It  also implies  a  stricter  policy of information  control  of local  Public 
Security  Bureaus,  due to tense relations  with local  minority  groups.  However, 
when looked at with the findings of the Harvard Study in mind, it is possible to 
argue  that  message  deletion  in  these  provinces  is  done  to  forestall  social 
mobilization in regions that are especially sensitive to such activities.
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A  third  study  by  MIT  Sloan  School  of  Management  attempted  a  'reverse 
engineering' project of the Weibo deletion process3. The study found evidence of 
what appears to be the practice of large scale pre-emptive deletions during days 
leading  up to  events  that  in  the  view of  the  Chinese  state  could  cause  social 
instability – here, correlating with the findings of the Carnegie Mellon University 
study  regarding  spikes  in  deletions  during  periods  of  sensitive  reports  in 
traditional  media  (Tschang  2012).  For  example  censors  started  deleting  posts 
related  to  famous  dissident-artist  Ai  Weiwei  several  days  before  his  arrest  in 
Beijing  in  April  2012.  This  indicates  a  pre-emptive  take  on  public  opinion 
channelling.  The study also found that posting politically sensitive information 
after 11 P.M on a Friday would result in a greatly decreased rate of deletion – 
probably  because  most  of  censorship  measures  are  undertaken  by  a  human 
workforce as opposed to automatic systems, pointing to the manpower restrictions 
of the government's censorship project (Ibid.).
All  three  studies  found  that  any  mention  of  the  censorship  administrators 
themselves, or of the censorship system as a whole, would always lead to deletion 
of the message and related responses. (Bamman et al  2012) (King et  al  2012) 
(Tschang 2012)
In summary, the answers provided by the three studies described above imply 
that  government  censorship  of  online  social  media  is  a  hands-on  process, 
organised  and  directly  supervised  by  the  central  authorities.  Furthermore,  in 
combination  the  findings  suggest  that  the  censorship  apparatus  is  largely 
concerned  with  preventing  large  scale  incidents.  Posts  that  are  critical  of  the 
government are not specifically targeted, as could be thought when one views the 
censorship policies undertaken for traditional media. 
I  will  use  the  findings  of  these  three  studies,  as  well  as  my  background 
research regarding internet and social media in China in general, to formulate a 
hypothesis below.
3A summary of the study is available here: www.niemanlab.org/2012/05/reverse-engineering-
chinese-censorship-when-and-why-are-controversial-tweets-deleted: accessed 2013-03-16)
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2 Hypothesis
2.1 State and users 
Before describing the censorship of Sina Weibo specifically, I will first attempt to 
conceptualize the relationship between the state and user in the Chinese online 
environment.
By the year 2013 the number of Chinese citizens using the internet is reported 
at  a  total  of 564 million,  about  42% of the total  population  of 1.3 billion.  In 
contrast, internet usage in Scandinavian countries is often around 90%, and in the 
US around 70-75%.4 A total of 1 billion – 76% of the population – Chinese own a 
cell  phone, of which 420 million are smart  phones and used to connect to the 
internet (CNNIC 2013). I would like to underline that the role of the spread of 
mobile phones in China cannot be understated. Here, citizens have previously had 
few channels of communication, and the platform that the cell phone provides is 
almost revolutionary.
In  terms  of  regional  differences,  the  internet  coverage  somewhat  mirrors 
already existing  socio-economic  divides.  In  general,  most  websites  are  hosted 
from Beijing, Guangdong  or Shanghai, the three main metropolis and economic 
powerhouses of China. Out of over 2,680,000 websites, only 972 are hosted in 
Tibet. Rural internet usage in rural areas is much lower on average than in urban 
areas – 23.7% versus 59.1%. Internet communities dealing with regional issues 
are more tightly controlled in the periphery than in the central cities as well.(Ibid.) 
The Chinese internet can be argued despite regulations to be a very vibrant 
place,  in  some  ways  proving  false  earlier  expectation  on  the  limitation  of 
submitting internet to political oversight. The fact that English language sites such 
as Facebook, Twitter and search engines such as Google are blocked has proved 
to  be  of  only  minor  consequence  as  they  have  been  replaced  by  domestic 
alternatives which often cater better to Chinese tastes while allowing a degree of 
political oversight by censorship authorities.
There  has  been  misgivings  regarding  an  online  medium  restricted  by 
censorship affecting economic development. However, as has been pointed out by 
associate  Professor Marina Svensson of Lund University,  among the emerging 
economic power houses of the world, China is far ahead when it comes to internet 
penetration  despite  its  authoritarian  political  system.  In comparison  to  China's 
4Global statistics on internet penetration can be found at http://www.itu.int 
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40%, India measures just 10.2% of the population, Thailand 27.4%, and Indonesia 
22.4%. When it comes to North African countries affected by the Arab spring, 
where social media was seen as an important catalyst in social organisation, the 
figures are even lower on average: Tunisia 36.3%, Egypt 26.4%, Syria 19.8%, and 
Libya 5.9%. (Svensson  2012:32)   
This all argues for the fact that the Chinese government is not as afraid of 
online and offline public opinion as it might seem. Rather, it actively promotes the 
expansion of internet infrastructure, despite the supposed threat to one Party rule. 
Tim Hardy likens the Party's treatment of internet based public opinion with The 
Hundred Flowers Campaign of the 1950s5 (Hardy 2011:22). Government  think 
tanks and policy organisations seem to agree: according to the ”30th Statistical 
report on Internet development in China” published by China Internet Network 
Information  Center  (CNNIC  2013),  the  Chinese   internet  and  social  media 
services are today extremely vibrant. Perhaps due to the restrictive atmosphere of 
official newspapers, there is evidence that public opinion has increasingly been 
shifted onto online discussion boards and other social media. 
The  Chinese  government  has  tried  to  catch  up  with  this  change.  The 
importance  of  the  expansion  of  internet  based  mediums  as  a  method  of 
communication has not bypassed the Party, and steps have been taken to conquer 
this new channel of communication for public diplomacy purposes. The study of 
the  online  sphere  is  taken  seriously  by  the  Chinese  government.  A  report 
published by the  Chinese Academy of  Governance,  ”2012 Government  Micro 
blog Evaluation Report 2012 ”  年中国政务微博客评估报告 (CAG 2012), details 
the changing approach of the state when dealing with online based public opinion, 
urging better education of cadres in the handling of social media. Among other 
things, it states that cadres need to achieve a better understanding of how Chinese 
society  has  changed  through  the  expansion  of  internet  access  among  Chinese 
citizens. With the objective of better handling of public opinion, as of the end of 
2012  a  total  of  176,700  government  departments,  institutes,  ministries  and 
officials have opened Weibo accounts. However, it has been noted that officials 
with Weibo accounts tend to be lower level cadres (Ibid.).
Not  all  censorship  measures  by  the  Chinese  government  have  this  soft 
approach however.  More generally  known in the West  is  the Chinese internet 
censorship project, codenamed Project Golden Shield, which  was started in 1998 
and passed inspection by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in 2006. One of 
the project's  components  deals  with the blocking of  foreign  sites, in  the West 
better  known  by  its  nickname  the  Great  Firewall  of  China.  Project Golden 
Shield's methods of control include IP blocking, DNS filtering and redirection, 
URL filtering, packet filtering and connection resets between users and specific 
websites.6 (Zattrain and Edelman 2003) In addition,  it is believed that more than 
5The  Hundred Flowers Campaign (百花运动) was a period between February 1956 to August 1957 where the 
CCP encouraged its citizens to openly express their opinions of the communist regime. After a slow start, the 
movement gained momentum, and before long open critique and condemnation of the communist system and the 
CCP was heard. In retribution, Mao Zedong launched the Anti-rightist Campaign (反右运动) in 1957 to deal 
with those who had been too harsh in their critique. 
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30.000  state  employees  are  tasked  with  policing  the  Chinese  internet  (Hardy 
2011:22)
For users within China, there are ways of evading these measures by using 
secure connections  or virtual  private  networks  (VPN).  However,  a  user  of  the 
Chinese internet is unlikely to encounter the Great Firewall during daily usage of 
domestic sites. The application of the Great Firewall of China, coupled with the 
cultural isolation and size of the country itself, has made the Chinese internet a 
thing apart from the rest of the global cyberspace. The average Chinese internet 
user  rarely  venture  outside  of  the  domestic  internet  domain,  nicknamed  the 
Chinternet by pundits.  
This structure of control over the internet by the government is enhanced by a 
system of self-censorship whereby censorship of sensitive material is mostly done 
by the service providers themselves.  Hosts  are  required to terminate  sites  that 
contain illegal material, and domestic social media sites delete sensitive material 
themselves, saving the central government from a huge drain of resources, while 
somewhat  putting  a  restraint  on  the  implementability  of  internet  censorship 
policies  (Hardy 2011:27)  (Svensson 2012:38).  The posts  analysed  in  the  case 
study later have been deleted by Sina's in-house administrators.  
However, at this point I would like to present another perspective of the state-
user  relation  in  the  Chinese  online  environment.  As  I  mentioned  above,  the 
expansion of  internet  infrastructure  in  China was directly  initiated  by massive 
government investment. It would make little sense for the Chinese government to 
build this kind of infrastructure just to have to devote enormous resources to its 
restriction. In fact, many researchers agree that the Chinese government sponsors 
online  debate  to  some  extent.  In  the  article Flatter  world  and thicker  walls?  
Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China, Rebecca McKinnon argues that:
The  Chinese  government  has  also  pursued  a  nationwide  e-government  strategy:  using 
online  mechanisms  for  citizen  feedback,  complaints  and  suggestions,  etc.  as  part  of  a 
strategy to bolster regime legitimacy (Kluver 2005a). Forums, chat rooms and blogs also 
serve as a “safety valve” by allowing enough room for a sufficiently wide range of subjects 
that people can let off steam about government corruption or incompetence, thus giving 
people more things to do with their frustrations before considering taking their gripes to the 
streets. 
(McKinnon 2007:33 )
That is to say, in Chinese society there exists a certain code of conduct for citizens 
to criticize the government and its policies, and this code of conduct exists online 
well. The nature of online censorship in China is not categorically oppressive, and 
online political discourse might have many legitimate functions sanctioned by the 
government. 
For instance, one of the positive changes that online media has brought with it 
is a greater level of governance. The Chinese state has historically been troubled 
6A more detailed account of the technical aspects of the Great Firewall is available here: 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/appendix-tech.html, accessed 2013-04-10
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with  poor  feed-back  in  central-local  communication,  more  specifically  in  the 
gathering of information about the plights of the poorest strata of society and the 
corrupt  dealings  of  local  governments.  With  the  decentralisation  that  three 
decades of economic reform has brought, this problem is as acute as ever. The 
expansion  of  online  social  media  has  somewhat  mitigated  this  problem. 
(McKinnon 2007) 
Furthermore,  if  one  follows  the  reports  on  Chinese  internet  censorship  in 
Western media, it would be easy to get the sense that Chinese internet users and 
the Chinese government are engaged in an endless tug-of-war where individual 
freedom of speech is in the balance. However, just as internet users anywhere else 
Chinese internet users are not mainly concerned with democratic discourse, but 
with entertainment. According to the latest statistical report by  CNNIC, a slight 
majority of 54,7% of users use micro blogs, only 48,8% of all internet users use 
social  networking  sites,  and  only  26,5%  use  discussion  boards  and  forums 
(CNNIC 2013). It can be argued that only a fraction of these users actually engage 
in political discussions. Of these an even smaller fraction of individuals will be 
engaged in discourse  that  is  openly critical  of  the  government;  and as  I  have 
explained,  there  is  a  great  distinction  between  critique  levelled  at  the  central 
government and critique levelled at local governments.
In short, according to the available research data the average Chinese internet 
user is not very much concerned with the prevalence of government control over 
the  internet,  if  they  are  even  aware  of  it  in  the  first  place.  Furthermore,  and 
perhaps  harder  to  understand for  a  Westerner,  they  might  even condone such 
control and restriction of their personal freedom for the greater good of online and 
offline  society.  According  to  the  survey  Most  Chinese  Say  They  Approve  of  
Government Internet Control conducted by Deborah Fallows of Pew Internet & 
American Life Project in 2008, 85% of respondents stated that they had a positive 
stance  towards   government  management  and control  of  the  internet  (Fallows 
2008). 
One example of this  is  the newly introduced ”Weibo Contract”7,  which,  at 
least  theoretically,  now binds  users  to  refrain  from activities  such as  personal 
attacks,  scams, sexual harassment,  as well  as subversion against the state. The 
nature of the contract should serve as a good example of the  raison d'être  and 
fundamental  principles  of social  media censorship,  as well  as Chinese internet 
regulation as a whole. Just as the previous study on censorship presented above 
suggests, internet regulation is not wholly concentrated on stifling critique of the 
Party. This point I have already expounded upon in chapter 1.3 ”Recent research 
on censorship”. With a general outline of the interplay between the internet user 
and the state in place,  I will  now move on to the subject of social  media and 
censorship.
7The contract is available here, Mandarin version: http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/gongyue
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2.2 Social media and censorship
On  Sina  Weibo,  censorship  is  conducted  through  search  term  blocks  (where 
specific words are blocked temporarily or permanently, obstructing users' ability 
to find posts with characters containing these words) and through active deletions 
of  posts,  as  well  as  account  deletions  and  suspensions.  Seven  hundred 
administrators  tasked  with  censorship  activities  work  for  Sina  Weibo  alone. 
(Ramzy 2011) 
In times of specific need, such as political scandals, Chinese domestic media 
has reported on an increase in the number of administrators employed by Sina for 
censorship  purposes.  For  example,  such  an  increase  was  announced  after  the 
website  was  temporarily  shut  down  for  clean-up  purposes  after  the  Bo  Xilai 
scandal broke in March 20128 (Chao 2012). In the earnings report for the second 
quarter of 2012, Sina reported that its expenses totalled €56 million, an increase 
from the figure of €48 million reported in the same quarter in 2011. The report 
stated that the increase was primarily the cause of personnel-related expenses and 
infrastructure-related expenses, and were mostly related to the weibo.com domain. 
(Sina 2012) This suggests that the burden of censorship is placed on the service 
providers themselves, and that the Communist Party values the protection against 
social  instability  higher  than  the  restriction  such  measures  might  have  on 
economic growth.
Despite censorship measures, it is apparent that at the current date micro blogs 
can  still  act  as  an  important  medium  for  spreading  information  about mass 
incidents, and in the organisation of collective social action.  Micro-blogging has 
in China, just as in the rest of the world, blurred the boundary between consumer 
and producer  of  media.  With  the  advent  of  cheap camera  equipped hand-held 
devices and widespread 3G internet access, users can quickly create and spread 
news. China is world famous for its ambitious censorship project of traditional 
media, placing at number 173 in the 2013 ranking of the Press Freedom Index 
(PFI)  by  the  Reporters  Without  Borders  (2013).  The  introduction  of  micro-
blogging onto the Chinese internet has potentially changed the face of censorship 
in China, by requiring censors to police the content of over 200 million producers 
of information,  as opposed to traditional media where control of publication is 
relatively easy in comparison.
This is evident in the elaborate tactics used by users who are aware of the 
presence of censorship on weibo. To evade censorship, users sometimes resort to 
for example using pinyin (the official system of transcribing Chinese characters 
into the Latin alphabet), by writing in English or any other language, by writing in 
abbreviations, the use of slang, creating new words or using different characters 
with the same pronunciation as the intended word, or by employing a word in a 
8Bo Xilai was the member of the Politburo and Party Secretary of Chongqing, a large city in central China, until 
his downfall in the first months of 2012. The offical motive was his implication in his wife's murder of English 
businessman Neil Heywood. However speculations of his ousting being due to political maneuvering were and 
still are numerous.
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new  context9 (Svensson  2012).  The  use  of  videos  and  pictures  in  spreading 
messages is a common tactic among Chinese internet users, since these bypass 
automatic censorship systems, and must be deleted manually by administrators. In 
the case of mass protests, they are an especially effective form of communication. 
During the summer of 2012, social media proved essential to the  Not in My 
Backyard (NIMBY) demonstrations  in  Shifang,  Sichuan province,  and Qidong 
close  to  Shanghai.  Here,  social  media  based  public  opinion  was  evidently  an 
effective medium for spreading information and for organisers to gain support. 
Even more importantly,  despite a relatively fast censorship response the events 
were  observed  and commented  on by millions  of  micro  blog  users  all  across 
China,  making  social  media  the  'window  to  the  world'  for  the  protesters. 
According to Qian Gang of the University of Hong Kong's China Media Project, 
between  1  and  4  July  "there  were  around  5.25  million  posts  on  Sina  Weibo 
containing the word 'Shifang'. Of these about 400,000 included images and close 
to 10,000 included video.” (Qian 2012) 
In the case of Shifang and Qidong, local leaders had approved the construction 
of  industries  which gave  rise  to  environmental  concerns  among local  citizens. 
Since  local  media  are  controlled  by  the  local  government,  and  cross-regional 
reporting of investigative journalists is becoming increasingly restricted by central 
government policies (Nieman Lab 2011), internet based social media proved to be 
one of a few effective mediums available for people to spread the message of their 
grievances to a wider audience.
The result of the at times violent protests – broadcasted on micro blogs – was 
the cessation of construction of the polluting factories. A week after the Qidong 
riots  –  which  in  traditional  media  were  given  little  attention  after  the  initial 
protests most likely due to a government ban on reporting – senior members of Hu 
Jintao’s  leadership  group  encouraged  cadres  to  “listen  closely  to  the  masses” 
(Xinhua 2012). The message was for local leaders to first try to mediate through 
dialogue instead of relying on brute force to end demonstrations (Caixin 2012). 
This can be seen as a call for increased attention to be paid to public opinion; 
social media based public opinion included.
As mentioned above, it should be noted that on the whole these protests follow 
accepted methods of social discourse between the Party and the People. At the 
moment  these  mass  incidents  take  the  form  of  demonstrations  against  local 
governments, and demonstrators and social media users frequently appeal to the 
central government for help. The central government is seen as a benefactor and 
mediator between the People and corrupt local governments. As such, at this time 
these  demonstrations  are  not  “democracy  demonstrations”,  even  though  some 
calls for democratization might be heard. As proposed by MacKinnon, the same is 
true  for  social  media  activities  online  (MacKinnon  2007:33).  Furthermore,  as 
mentioned above censorship in China matters little to the vast majority of Chinese 
9 One example is the word ”harmony”,  和谐 hexie in Chinese. Originaly state jargon, it has been employed by 
internet users to indicate censorship. When a post has been censored it has been harmonised. Incidentally the 
pronounciation is a homophone of the word for river crab 河蟹, which is also used for the same purpose. 
Another example is the expression ”to be invited for tea”,   被喝茶 bei he cha in chinese. This means that 
someone has been taken in for questioning by the police, often related to the fate of online activists.
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citizens. Most do not even realize that censorship is taking place, and might only 
be faced by this fact in cases of mass incidents. Even then it seems like the blame 
is  placed on the local  government  instead of the central  government,  which is 
largely  perceived  to  be  acting  for  the  good of  the  nation  and people.  (Hardy 
2011:23)
However, it is apparent that the central government is becoming increasingly 
aware and concerned about the implication the increased exposure and attention 
mass incidents get thanks to social media. An example is the scandal surrounding 
Feng Jianmei, a woman who was forced to abort her 7 months pregnancy and had 
the dead foetus placed on the bed beside her. This picture was uploaded to social 
media,  and received widespread attention for several  weeks, sparking a debate 
about the one-child policy and the Family Planning Commission, as well as giving 
attention to similar cases all over the country. In the wake of this scandal, officials 
were implored not to 'implement policies too zealously' in Party newspapers, and 
to be mindful of how their actions might be interpreted if magnified by the social 
media lens (BBC 2012).
Another example is the anger on social media after the devastating floods in 
Beijing and northern China during the summer rains of 2012, killing at least 79 
people  and  causing  the  collateral  damage  of  at  least  10  billion  Yuan  worth. 
Critique of the lack of preparedness of the local government reached high levels 
on  social  media,  despite  efforts  by  traditional  media  to  direct  public  opinion 
towards a focus on rescue efforts and reconstruction programmes (BBC 2012). 
Perhaps the most potent example is the social  mobilisation surrounding the 
Wenzhou train crash in July 2011. Two trains collided near Wenzhou close to 
Shanghai, killing 40 people and leaving over 192 injured (Chen 2011). Traditional 
media kept silent, but weibo was filled with videos of what looked like a state 
initiated cover up, where the wreck were buried by bull dozers before they had 
been examined by a technical team. The reactions online inadvertently sanctioned 
further investigative reports by traditional media, and has lead to a potential death 
sentence for the once almighty Minister of Railways Liu Zhijun (Li 2013).
By presenting these examples I wish to alert the reader to a fact that  may be 
true for all political systems characterised by restricted access to information; the 
threat that social media poses to Party legitimacy if not handled correctly cannot 
be stressed enough.  I argue that, while expansion of social media is indeed in the 
interest  of the CCP, just as it cannot restrict  it  totally it can ill  afford to let it  
develop freely.  Censorship is  but  one – although vital  –  part  of e-governance 
strategies developed by the Chinese state. Indeed, according to the report made by 
CNNIC, it has become increasingly vital for provincial cadres to understand that 
covering  up  local  problems  might  cause  greater  damage  to  the  prestige  and 
legitimacy of the Party as a whole,  when and if  these problems reach a wider 
audience  through  social  media.  The  increase  in  government  Weibo  accounts 
speaks for the fact that the government is taking more and more seriously the role 
that social media has in China (CNNIC 2013).
It should be noted that social media in China has – just as studies of Western 
Twitter suggest – not become a loud speaker for the politically dispossessed. In 
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general  the  existing  power  structures  of  Chinese  society  remain  intact  online. 
Those who already have political or social clout are more likely to be heard online 
(Svensson 2013). The examples listed above all prove this, as they only gained 
popular momentum after getting picked up by a famous user who could act as a 
popularising proponent. Preliminarily I would suggest that the same should then 
be true for the focus of censorship on weibo; posts made by and originating from 
famous users should be more often targeted than posts made by average users.
In this chapter I have argued that, while the censorship activities by Chinese 
internet regulators are among the most draconian in the world, it is a mistake to 
think  that  all  regulators  do  is  to  monitor  and  delete  content  sensitive  to  the 
Chinese Communist Party and the government. Firstly, the advent and spread of 
the internet and social media in China has enabled the Chinese government to 
overcome the historic problem of poor feedback of local grievances to the centre 
because of too many layers in between. Here, just as with the internet in China as 
a  whole,  social  media  provides  the  central  government  with  a  channel  of 
information regarding activities by grass root cadres that could upset the social 
balance.  However,  the  delicate  balance  of  censorship  that  this  requires  is  a 
constant challenge of allowing users to report on local problems while making 
sure that these posts do not lead to collective social action that could potentially 
spark revolts on a wider scale. 
2.3 Formulation of hypothesis
The combined results of the studies conducted by Western researchers and my 
background  research  regarding  Chinese  internet  censorship  measures  and 
relationship between user and state suggests that the main function of censorship 
measures by the Chinese government is to prevent large scale incidents, regardless 
if these incidents are for or against the CCP.
Censorship is also done with an eye on events reported in traditional media 
that might have political consequences, and on future events that might have a 
mobilising effect on the populace. There is a higher deletion rate in peripheral 
provinces with a historically bad relation with the Party. Also, any mention of the 
censorship administrators or the censorship system will be deleted.
For this purpose I believe that looking for mass incident potential  (henceforth 
MIP) in posts is critical to understanding censorship guidelines. I have defined 
MIP as content that openly encourage protest, that speak about historic examples 
of protest,  that  refer to  ongoing protest  or future protests  connected  to certain 
dates. I have also included references to ongoing discussions that might have the 
potential of inspiring social protest.  
  
To test the validity of this hypothesis, I will now conduct a case study of deleted 
social media posts. 
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3 Case Study
3.1 Method
3.1.1 WeiboScope Search
Since the launch of Sina Weibo in 2009, researchers at the University of Hong 
Kong had very limited  understanding  of  the  impact  of  social  media  in  China 
economically, politically, and socially. At the same time it was obvious that some 
form of change had taken place in Chinese society during the end of the 2000s. 
For example, the kind of discussion that followed the ousting of Bo Xilai in 2012 
did not happen after the ousting of the Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 
2006.  The  study  of  Chinese  social  media  was  far  behind  that  of  the  more 
accessible  Western  counterparts,  and  therefore  a  whole  slew of  projects  were 
started.  At  the  time,  very little  was known about  the  underlying  principles  of 
censorship of social media by the Chinese state. The result was the construction of 
a database of deleted posts on Sina Weibo, named  WeiboScope Search10 (from 
now on called WBS for convenience). WBS was set up by the Journalism and 
Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong. By the beginning of 2012 
researchers started to share their findings with the public, and at the same time the 
database was also made available online (Chiu 2012). 
The database is relatively simple in construction. It consists of a ”crawling 
software” that scans the time lines of 5000 users with more than 100.000 fans 
several times a day, storing posts that have been deleted since the last scan. As 
such, the database does not take into account the postings of less active and less 
popular users. However, I still  believe that studying the deleted posts made by 
influential users is valid and can provide results that can be generalised. I would 
argue that censors pay extra attention to posts made by active and popular users, 
since their impact on public opinion is proportional to their fan base. I would also 
argue  that  any  form of  social  organisation  can  only  happen  if  it  catches  the 
attention of key users – here again due to the socio-economic structures remaining 
intact online.   
10The database is available here: http://research.jmsc.hku.hk/social/search.py/sinaweibo/
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It has been pointed out that the database provides inaccurate results in regards 
to the actual time of deletion of posts (Nieman Lab 2012). The program does not 
capture the time of deletion, but rather the first time a message has been spotted as 
missing by the software. I have taken this into consideration when constructing 
my case study, not placing as heavy emphasis on the exact time of the day a post 
has been deleted.
The public version of WBS lists the last 500 deleted posts in order of original 
date of posting, followed by the time it was discovered as missing. Therefore any 
case study using the public  version of  WBS has  to  be conducted  with a  very 
hands-on  approach,  the  researcher  making  sure  that  the  database  is  checked 
regularly  for  new developments.  Posts  are  presented  in  their  entirety,  as  they 
would look on Sina Weibo, with the profile picture of the user visible, as well as 
any pictures the users have attached to their post. Only videos are not stored in the 
database, probably due to space and bandwidth restrictions. 
Since deleted posts are presented in order of the date of original posting, on 
the public version it is possible that the researcher has no way of seeing posts that 
are found and deleted more than twenty four hours after  their  original posting 
date.  However,  posts  that  are  deleted  during  the  first  wave of  posting  can  be 
argued  to  be  of  the  highest  priority  to  censors,  and  therefore  show the  daily 
changes  in  censorship  directives.  While  the  search  function  of  WBS  is  not 
available  to  the  public  due  to  the  great  strain  this  would  put  on  the  Centre's 
resources11, this does not affect the prospects of this thesis. I have constructed the 
case study to take these facts into consideration.
It has not been possible for me to ascertain if the deleted posts recorded by 
WBS are all the posts by the selected users that have been deleted on Sina Weibo 
in total, or if the system has missed some of the activities of censors. However, if 
the database is indeed incomplete, my case study is still valid, since it would mean 
that  the  population  studied  is  randomised  instead  of  specifically  selected 
(Esaiasson 2012:63). I would argue that a randomised selection of deleted posts 
between specific dates of sufficiently great numbers is still a desirable population 
for testing. However, since previous studies using WBS have gone forward with 
the assumption that the database provides an adequate overview of deleted posts 
(Tschang 2012), I have decided to do the same. 
3.1.2 Construction of case study
The goal of this case study is to try the hypothesis that I have formulated above. 
The selected start date for the case study was 5 May 2013, the end of the Labour 
Day holiday in China. This date was selected due to the holiday's relationship to 
traditional leftist values in China, which I thought would play into the Bo Xilai 
scandal of spring 2012, where Mao-era reminiscences were a big part of the so 
11It is however possible to contact the Centre personally and ask for access to certain segments of the data. Time 
contraints for this thesis made this option unfeasible however.
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called  ”Chongqing  model”12.  Also,  the  Bo  Xilai  case  has  gained  increased 
attention  lately  due to  rumours  of  an  impending  trial  (Phillips  2013),  fuelling 
online public opinion on the subject. The end date of the case study was 11 May 
2013,  a  somewhat  arbitrary  date  selected  due  to  time  constraints,  but  still 
sufficiently  removed from the start  date  to make a valid  analysis  possible.  As 
mentioned above, due to the construction of WBS and the limitation of only being 
able  to  see  the  last  500 deleted  posts, I  have  decided that  my main  focus  of 
analysis is to deduce the primary focus of the first phase of censorship measures 
on Sina Weibo.  
Previous studies have focused on finding and constructing a comprehensive 
database of sensitive key words that might lead to deletion if present in a message 
(Bamman  2012  and  King  2012).  Since  I  wanted  to  have  a  more  qualitative 
approach to my case study, I decided that the posts would be judged and classified 
on a holistic basis; this makes sense since Chinese internet users who are aware of 
the presence of censorship use cryptic language. Sensitive key words change over 
time,  and  trying  to  map  them  out  for  this  short  thesis  would  be  too  time 
consuming.
Therefore my approach was to read each post individually and then code it to 
a category related to its general content, rather than a specific key word present in 
the message.  For example,  a post that read ”Do you object?!!!  No I  do not”13 
might seem like a very arbitrary deletion.  However, when viewed with current 
events in mind, it was obvious that it was related to the rape and subsequent death 
by  suicide  of  migrant  worker  Yuan  Liya  on  4  May  (Kaiman  2013).  It  was 
therefore coded into the ”Beijing protest” category. While this approach proved to 
be  very time  consuming,  I  believe  it  was  the  only way to make  my analysis 
accurate enough.  
I have read and analysed a total of 1858 deleted posts between the selected 
dates as shown on WBS. I have then coded these posts into categories, related to 
their content. Categories were created as the case study progressed, with a total of 
29 categories. For the sake of inter-subjectivity I decided that the categories would 
be as general as possible, so that anyone who read a post would – hopefully – 
assign it to the same category as I did (Esaiasson 2012:24). For example, posts 
about  political  activists  like  Chen  Guangcheng  (陈光诚 ),  his  brother  Chen 
Guangfu (陈光福), Ai Weiwei (艾未未), or  other activists, have all been coded 
as ”Activists”, and posts regarding the private life of the highest leaders of China 
have all been coded as ”Highest leaders”. This is also related to the goal of my 
case study; I aim to prove that my hypothesis regarding the general guideline of 
censorship is true, not to map out specific key words. 
My operationalisation of MIP has been by looking first at the tone of posts 
assigned  to  a  category,  and  then  cross  referencing  that  category  with  current 
events. This operationalisation rests on the findings of the research presented in 
12Refers to the social and economic policies implemented during the tenure of Bo Xilai as Party Secretary in 
Chongqing, characterised by neo-leftist influences and the launching of ”Red Culture”, drawing parallells to 
social movements during the Cultural Revolution.
13   ”有异议吗？！！！没有
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chapter  1.3  above;  it  requires  the  researcher  to  have  intimate  knowledge  of 
modern  Chinese  history  as  well  as  ample  time  to  scan  both  domestic  and 
international media.
Assigning a post to a category would sometimes be very straight forward, and 
other times less so.  Some posts touched on a variety of categories, and in these 
cases I had to use reason to assign the post to what I considered to be the most 
relevant category. For the sake of statistical comprehension I decided that posts 
could not be assigned to more than one category. Thereafter, to see if censorship 
efforts  are  influenced by offline  events,  I  also cross checked these posts  with 
events of that particular day that were present in the media and on social media. 
This proved to be vital to my case study, as it showed that censorship efforts are 
closely tied to daily events. Some events are not touched at all upon in the media, 
but feature heavily online, while others have a great presence online and in the 
media,  but  are  not  censored as heavily despite  the critical  tone the discussion 
might have of government policies. 
3.2 Results and analysis
Below  are  the  results  of  the  case  study  (see  Table  1).  I  have  arranged  the 
categories in alphabetic order for convenience. I have also calculated the overall 
frequency of a specific category in relation to the total amount of deleted posts, 
and  I have grouped categories that are characterised by high MIP together at the 
top of the table, for clarity. Below I will explain the most important categories to 
the reader.
What stands out, but what I also expected, was the high rate of deleted posts 
on the high MIP subject of Bo Xilai – these posts account for a grand total of 
21.5%  (400).  This  category  had,  understandably,  no  coverage  whatsoever  in 
Chinese domestic media.  These posts were in a large number not original posts, 
that is to say that very few users wrote the post themselves, but instead forwarded 
already existing posts that they found on the subject. A very large number also 
contained pictures  or used cryptic  language.  It  is  interesting  to note that  even 
content that spoke negatively of Bo Xilai or the leftist ideology of the Chongqing 
model were deleted. What is also remarkable is the category's constant presence 
all through the case study. Only on the last day did the quantity measure below 30. 
This  would  speak for  a  censorship  policy  directing  extra  attention  and giving 
higher priority to anything that could relate to the political scandal of last year.
Another interesting category are posts on the Mao Yushi controversy. Mao is a 
well known liberal economist who in 2011 published an article that was highly 
critical of Mao Zedong (Economist 2011). He quickly became the target of leftist 
supporters who accused him of being a traitor to China and to the Communist 
Party. On 4 May 2013 Mao Yushi had to cancel a speaking event in Changsha, 
Hunan, due to online remarks indicating that he had been harassed online and 
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offline, sparking debate between his supporters and left-wing Maoists (Bai 2013). 
Here it is important to point out that very few posts of ordinary users that are 
negative  to  the  Mao  Zedong  legacy,  or  that  are  negative  to  the  Reform  and 
Opening  up  of  Deng  Xiaoping,  are  subject  to  speedy  deletion.  This  category 
concerns  online  remarks  made  by  already  politically  and  socially  powerful 
individuals. As such, this also proves that the power structures of online society 
mirrors those of Chinese society as a whole. 
Table 1 – Deleted posts on Sina Weibo 5-11 May 2013
Both the ”Bo Xilai” and ”Mao Yushi scandal” categories deal with public opinion 
that could have a seditious and inflammatory effect on the population, and that 
might lead to a greater level of organisation among the groups involved. They 
may also be connected, since critics of Mao Yushi are often leftists in ideological 
leanings. Hence they often refer to Bo Xilai in their posts, directly or indirectly. 
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Category 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 5.10 5.11 TOTAL % of TOTAL
Beijing Mall suicide 193 30 5 228 12.3%
Bo Xilai 94 34 30 52 38 136 16 400 21.5%
Corruption 17 26 8 1 2 54 2.9%
Diaoyu Dao 4 1 1 6 0.3%
Forced Demolition 1 3 4 0.2%
General anti-system 16 10 8 28 12 10 7 91 4.9%
General protest 3 1 18 16 6 44 2.4%
Mao Yushi contro. 23 99 15 4 8 149 8.0%
Minorities/Tibet/XJ 2 8 6 4 2 22 1.2%
NIMBY KM/CD/SH 1 12 102 31 3 12 161 8.7%
Police/state brutality 5 6 11 3 8 3 36 1.9%
Publicise property 9 2 1 6 2 20 1.1%
Tiananmen 1 2 2 4 10 4 1 24 1.3%
Activists 13 4 4 6 11 9 47 2.5%
Against Leftists 6 10 16 0.9%
Against rightists 8 8 11 27 1.5%
Censorship 15 2 4 17 6 13 11 68 3.7%
Disaster relief 6 1 3 10 0.5%
Falun Gong 4 1 5 0.3%
General environment 3 1 4 0.2%
Highest leaders 5 19 15 22 2 3 7 73 3.9%
Lao Gai 4 4 0.2%
Petition to WH 17 8 25 1.3%
Pornography 9 4 1 1 15 0.8%
Religious cadres 3 1 1 5 0.3%
Seven don't mention 126 68 194 10.4%
Xi Jinping 7 1 2 3 11 4 28 1.5%
Zhu Ling 15 29 5 49 2.6%
Other 8 11 6 4 9 11 49 2.6%
TOTAL 206 167 282 286 315 406 196 1858 100.0%
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The “Beijing Mall Suicide” category has been briefly explained above. This 
category was subject to the third highest rate of deletion at 12.3% (228 posts) of 
the  total.  The  deleted  posts  indicate  that  this  incident  came  under  censorship 
scrutiny due to the large crowd that gathered in the southern Beijing district of 
Fengtai, demanding that the police investigate the woman's fall from the fourth 
floor  of  a  shopping  mall.  Rumours   suggested  that  the  girl  had  been  raped, 
presumably  by  five  local  Communist  Party  members.  Demonstrations  in  the 
capital  is  an extremely sensitive subject,  and has  high MIP.  The incident  was 
reported  on  in  domestic  media,  and  censorship  measures  indicate  that  the 
authorities  wished to  control  the effect  that  the piece  of news would have on 
online  public  opinion.  The high  rate  of  deletion  on the  first  day at  193 posts 
indicate a concentrated effort by censors. 
The “NIMBY KM/CD/SH” deals with posts that had content on the NIMBY 
demonstrations in the cities of Kunming, Chengdu, and Shanghai (BBC 2013). 
The first two demonstrations took place roughly on May 5-7, and the last one in 
Shanghai had just started to make a presence on WBS as the case study concluded 
on May 11. This category had a comparably high rate of deletion at 8.7% of total 
(161 posts), and was, as the Beijing Mall Suicide, subject to a concentrated effort 
of deletion. While I had expected the high rate of deletion of posts related to Bo 
Xilai,  the  presence  of  categories  related  to  protests  and  popular  movements 
provides much credibility to my hypothesis. Offline, the approach to the handling 
of demonstrations by the central government varies; some types of demonstrations 
lead to a change in policies or even concessions on the part of local or central 
governments. NIMBY protests especially is a case where local citizens have in the 
past successfully made their  will  heard.  Therefore it  is interesting to note that 
NIMBY protests receive roughly the same treatment by social media censors as 
more politically problematic protest  such as the Beijing Mall Suicide.  I would 
argue that this is due to the fear of the central government that local legitimate 
protests might spread to other places affected by similar problems, and that, if 
connected, they might create a much larger problem that has great ramifications 
for system stability. This is an echo of the Tian'anmen protests of 1989 – also a 
high MIP category for the same reason – of which the current censorship practices 
could be argued to have sprung from. 
The “General anti-system” category were posts that were critical of the one-
party system, pro democratic reform along Western lines, of the economic system 
of  reforms,  and  with  the  “One  country,  two  systems”-policy14 towards  Hong 
Kong. These kinds of posts all had the inherent quality of having varying degrees 
of MIP, since many called for people to “wake up” to what they saw as the reality 
of Chinese society. Posts coded as “Corruption” often called for a public drive to 
publicise the property of Party members, or for exposure of corruption. This is a 
hot  topic  in  China,  and  despite  having  official  sanction  under  the  Xi-Li 
administration, online anti-corruption drives can often spread very quick, giving it 
a high MIP. 
14一国两制
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In contrast, the “Zhu Ling” category, posts dealing with the thallium poisoning 
case of a Qinghua student in the 1990s, saw a comparably low rate of deletion 
(2.6% of total, or 49 posts), despite having a heavy presence on Sina Weibo, and 
despite the effect it had on government policies (Li 2013). This speaks mostly for 
the fact that this category had a lower priority for censors due to not having as 
great a potential for inciting protest as the other contemporary categories above; it 
is an isolated, though tragic, incident that is quite unique. It is possible however 
that  a  “clean  up”  phase  is  initiated  later.  This  is  somewhat  indicated  by  the 
straggling  five  deleted  posts  on  May  10.  Further  research  using  the  search 
function of WBS would test the veracity of this hypothesis.
Posts  dealing  with  an  online  drive  to  send  petitions  to  President  Barrack 
Obama through the White House website originally sprung from the Zhu Ling 
controversy,  but quickly changed direction entirely.  Some of the deleted posts 
called  for  the  liberation  of  China  by  American  troops,15 or  the  international 
standardisation of bean curd jelly (豆腐脑) in its salty variety.16 These posts were 
probably deleted mainly due to having sprung from the Zhu Ling case, and not for 
their actual content.
The ”Against rightists” and ”Against leftists” categories were posts that could 
not specifically be placed in the categories related to Bo Xilai or Mao Yushi, and 
that dealt with for instance the Deng Xiaoping legacy or the privatisation drive 
since the ”Reform and opening up”.17  Posts in this category were not directly 
system critical, and they could portray the current system in both a positive and 
negative light. The same was true for posts relating to Xi Jinping –  a lot of which 
had   degrading  or  satirical  content  regarding  the  President  or  the  ”Chinese 
Dream”,18 the new political term coined by the Xi-Li administration. Also, posts 
with information on the highest leaders of the country and their private lives were 
dealt with in the same way. This could perhaps be due to the known attitude of the 
Chinese leadership regarding the wish to remain aloof from the masses. These 
categories were not designated as MIP categories, since they were perceived to be 
more part of public opinion channelling initiatives than attempts to forestall social 
protest.
Categories  where  MIP  was  hard  to  determine  were  “Activists”,  “Disaster 
Relief”, “Falun Gong” and “Lao Gai(Labour camps)”. In general, however, posts 
in these categories were not seditious, but rather were aimed at a small number of 
users using cryptic language. Posts on the same subjects with higher MIP were 
coded as “General anti-system”. 
The ”Censorship” category were posts that dealt with the censorship system 
itself,  and  that  detailed  previous  activity  by  users  that  had  been  subject  to 
censorship. Connected to this is the ”Seven don't mentions”. A document from 
within the censorship administration, with seven topics that should be avoided by 
all party members in all official speeches and functions,  had started to circulate 
15中国人民求解放！
16我们请求美国政府将豆腐脑的官方味道定位咸味，即使用料酒，生抽，木耳，香菇碎，黄花菜和鸡蛋
制成的卤汁调味
17改革开放
18中国梦
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on  Sina  Weibo  some  months  ago.   On  May  10  He  Bing,  professor  at  the 
University of Political  Science and Law in Beijing and a member of the CCP, 
argued against this policy.  This led to his account being suspended, once more 
fuelling the debate online, as well as the rate of deletion. It is interesting to note 
that post in this category increased in general after heightened censorship efforts 
tied to other categories. This echoes the findings of both the Bamman and King 
study (Bamman 2012 and King 2012).  The Censorship category has not  been 
designated  as a  MIP category as  such, due to  the ambiguous  attitude  towards 
censorship of Chinese citizens presented above. 
In total,  posts with high MIP  account for about 70% of all deleted posts. It 
must be pointed out that due to the construction of the database, it is possible that 
this rate gets lower as posts of other categories fill up the database. However, we 
can see here that the prevention of mass incidents is by far the primary objective 
of censorship efforts on Sina Weibo.
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4 Conclusion
Through the case study I have proved the veracity of my hypothesis. The only 
thing I  could not verify was the higher  rate  of deletions  in China's  periphery. 
However, this has already been sufficiently proved by previous studies.
In general, censorship of social media in China must be seen as part of a much 
bigger context. An online/offline dichotomy is too simplistic by far. Censorship is 
done  with  an  eye  on  current  events  and  how they might  affect  online  public 
opinion. The greatest focus of censors is on preventing and obstructing the spread 
and organisation of large scale popular protest. This is different from government 
treatment  of  local  protests.  Protest  serves  as  an  indicator  for  the  central 
government  of  local  conditions;  social  media  may  also  have  this  function. 
However the magnifying lens that it  puts on events, and the influence it gives 
actors with an agenda differing from that of the central government, has caused 
the central government to focus on restricting the spread of posts with high mass 
incident potential. To this end, it is not remarkable that almost all posts subjected 
to speedy deletions are made by or have content relating to influential online or 
offline persona, and very few posts by ordinary citizens receive the same attention 
by censorship administrators. 
This does not speak against the fact that the government is using social media 
to  its  own advantage.  The interplay of  state  and user  online  is  complex.  It  is 
characterised by a steady drama of cooperation and coercion, and is not so much a 
tug-of-war as a relationship of negotiation and compromise. State control of the 
internet  is  not  necessarily  seen as  malevolent  by Chinese citizens.  The use of 
social media to break scandals and mobilising opinion against corrupt officials is a 
legitimate use of social media, and serves Party goals as long as it is kept within 
boundaries of control. Whenever possible, the Party does its best to steer online 
public  opinion  into  a  direction  that  benefits  it  the  most.  In  general,  primary 
censorship measures are influenced by a fear of another Tian'anmen incident, and 
not by a fear of losing ideological control.  
As  a  closing  remark,  I  would  like  to  point  to  the  subtitle  of  this  thesis: 
”controlling the narrative or letting a hundred flowers bloom”. I would say that 
the Party has done neither, or a bit of both. The Party has realised the need for a 
relatively  free  form  of  public  opinion  in  China,  and  has  encouraged  its 
development. At the same time it has been loathe to let go of the reins completely.  
Instead of drawing parallels to the past, researchers of the Chinese internet should 
focus on understanding the new and fresh perspective of Chinese society that the 
internet and social media has created in China. 
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